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• Deﬁned-beneﬁt (DB) pension funds continue to account
for the largest share of the assets of employer pension
funds.1 In recent years, many DB pension plans have
become underfunded, prompting a reassessment of
investment and risk-management practices.
• In Canada, as in other industrialized countries,2 funding
deﬁcits have highlighted the challenges of managing the
ﬁnancial risks of older DB pension plans that have a high
ratio of retired to active employees. There has been
substantial growth in pension assets and liabilities as the
workforce has aged and beneﬁt obligations have accrued.
Consequently, short-term volatility in pension fund
returns can have an increasingly large effect on the
ﬁnancial status of the plan sponsor.
• In light of these challenges, there is a broader interest in
liability-driven approaches to investment and risk
management. This has not yet resulted in a signiﬁcant
reallocation of assets, but as funding improves and the
workforce continues to age, pension funds could shift an
increasing share of portfolio assets into ﬁxed-income
securities that provide a better match to plan liabilities.
• Low interest rates and reduced expectations for returns
on publicly traded equities are also inﬂuencing pension
sector investment, prompting many plan sponsors to
invest in alternative assets and to shift more resources
into active management.
1. DB and deﬁned contribution (DC) are the two basic types of beneﬁt associ-
ated with employer pension plans. At the end of 2002, DB plans accounted for
92 per cent ($512 billion) of the assets of trusteed pension plans, compared
with 7 per cent ($42 billion) for DC and combined DC/DB. The focus of this
review is on the DB pension sector, but it should be noted that there has been
an increasing trend towards DC plans over the past 15 years.
2. DB pension sector underfunding is not unique to Canada. Beginning in
about 2002, the DB pension sector became underfunded in other countries,
including the United Kingdom and the United States.
any Canadian deﬁned-beneﬁt (DB) pen-
sion funds3 have become underfunded in
recent years, in sharp contrast to the late
1990s, when numerous pension funds had
large actuarial surpluses.4 A severe downturn in glo-
bal equity markets from 2000 to 2002 reduced the
value of pension assets substantially because many
pension funds had large allocations to equities. At the
same time, a decline in long-term interest rates increased
the present value of accrued pension liabilities.
Over the short term, continued improvement in pen-
sion fund returns5 and an increase in interest rates
would help to alleviate pension underfunding.
However, the deterioration in the ﬁnancial health of
DB pension plans has underlined various longer-
term structural issues that could make it increasingly
difﬁcult for plan sponsors to manage the ﬁnancial
risks of DB plans.6 For example, improved longevity
and generous benefits, such as an early-retirement
3.   We examine both public (PS) and corporate (private) sector (CS) pension
funds. PS plans are subject to somewhat different regulation, accounting, and
incentive structures; however, they are generally funded similarly to CS plans
and face common investment and risk-management issues. A key difference
is that taxpayers assume the role of shareholders and could ultimately bear
the cost of PS pension deﬁcits.
4. The funded status of DB plans in the Canadian private sector is explored in
Armstrong (2004). Note that many PS pension funds are underfunded as well.
5.   Median nominal pension fund returns for a typical balanced fund were
13.5 per cent in 2003 and 10.1 per cent in 2004 (RBC Global Services).
6. A number of these issues pertain to weaknesses in the design and regulation
of DB plans, a topic which is generally beyond the scope of this article. For a dis-
cussion of these issues, see Ambachtsheer (2004), Bonnar and Service (2004),
and CGA Canada(2004). Note also that public consultations on the regulation of
DB pension plans were launched this year by the federal government (for feder-
ally regulated pension plans) and by the Régie des rentes du Québec. See the
respective websites for more details (http://www.fin.gc.ca/activty/consult/
PPBnfts_e.html and http://www.rrq.gouv.qc.ca/en/programmes/rcr/
consultation_financement.ht).
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option, have increased the cost of providing a DB plan
by lengthening the period for paying out the pension
beneﬁt. At the same time, the assets and liabilities of
DB plans have grown substantially as the workforce
has aged, sometimes equalling or exceeding the market
capitalization of the ﬁrm. As we have seen in recent
years, swings in pension fund performance can cause
increasingly large unexpected cash contributions and
adjustments to the ﬁnancial results of plan sponsors.7
Investment strategies focused mainly
on asset returns are giving way to a
liability-driven approach to
investment and risk management.
To better address these risks, a number of plan sponsors
appear to be directing more time and effort towards
aligningthefunding ofpensionplans withinvestment
policy. Investment strategies focused mainly on asset
returns are giving way to a liability-driven approach
to investment and risk management. The broad interest
in this type of approach is tempered, however, by such
factors as the need to eliminate funding deﬁcits, a low
yield environment, and changing investment beliefs.
With regard to the latter, most fund managers expect
that traditional asset classes will produce modest returns,
at best, over the next decade or more, presenting a
considerable challenge for returning pension funds to
ﬁnancial health.
Objectives and Scope
In this article, we examine how funding deﬁcits, a
greater focus on plan liabilities, a low yield environ-
ment, and changing investment beliefs are inﬂuencing
investment decisions in the Canadian DB pension
sector, which includes both public sector (PS) and
private (corporate) sector (CS) funds. We focus on
the main emerging trends and consider the implica-
tions for domestic financial markets. Over the past
two decades, the assets of Canadian trusteed pen-
sion funds, which include both DB and DC plans,
have grown considerably, to a market value of
7.   For example, off-balance-sheet debt, such as pension fund liabilities, is
beginning to be reﬂected in the ﬁrms’ credit rating. In 2002, Standard and
Poor’s downgraded the ratings of General Motors Corporation (GM) and
Ford Motor Credit Company (Ford), citing pension deﬁcits as the primary
reason.
$688 billion,8 equivalent to about 50 per cent of gross
domestic product (GDP). Even a small reallocation
of sector assets, for example, from publicly traded
equities to long-term bonds, has implications for
the efficiency and stability of financial markets and
government borrowing programs.
Our ﬁndings draw heavily on interviews with indus-
try professionals, since the existing data sources are
limited, particularly with regard to investment policy
and risk management. The information acquired in
interviews complements that obtained from a litera-
ture review, selected PS pension fund annual reports,
and an analysis of the available data sources.9 Inter-
views were conducted with representatives of
selected public and private sector DB pension plans,
multi-fund asset managers, the Canada Pension Plan
(CPP), and consultants.10 The selection of interviewees
was biased towards mid- to large-sized pension
funds,11 since these funds represent a large share of
overall sector assets and tend to be innovative in
investment strategy and risk management. Interviews
were held with managers of PS pension funds and
assets12 that collectively totalled over $280 billion at
the end of 2003. CS pension funds were selected both
on the basis of size and to include a broad cross-sec-
tion of industry groups; these funds managed assets
of nearly $50 billion.
We begin by describing how DB pension plans are
funded. This leads into a discussion of changing views
regarding the equity-risk premium (ERP). We then
examinetheshifttowardsliability-centredapproaches
to investment and how these developments are begin-
ning to inﬂuence pension sector investment in three
related areas: a reduced exposure to publicly traded
8. As of 1 December 2004 (Statistics Canada). Trusteed pension plans (see De
Leon 1995–1996) are the main type of employer pension plan, accounting for
70 per cent of assets. The ﬁgures do not include the assets of the Canada and
Quebec pension plans.
9.   The available data on actual sector investment is typically highly aggre-
gated, unweighted to adjust for the size of the pension fund, and may not
adequately reﬂect the pension sector’s use of derivatives to gain exposure to
various assets.
10.   Interviews were held in December 2004 and early 2005 with staff of the
three largest actuarial/investment consulting ﬁrms: Mercer Investment Con-
sulting, Watson Wyatt, and Towers Perrin. Consultants at Greenwich Associ-
ates were also interviewed.
11.   The funds were selected from the Beneﬁts Canada list of top 100 pension
funds, which represent about 85 per cent of the assets of trusteed pension
funds. Mid- to large-sized pension funds include those with assets above
$900 million.
12.  Including the Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec, which manages
the assets of the Quebec Pension Plan (QPP) and provincial PS plans.23 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2005
equities in the policy asset mix, an increased role for
active management, and greater attention to asset-
liability (A/L) matching. We then consider additional
inﬂuences on the pension sector: the limited supply of
long-term bonds, the elimination of the foreign-
property rule, and the movement towards fair-value
pension accounting and a financial-economics
approach to actuarial valuation. We conclude with a
brief discussion of how these developments could
inﬂuence ﬁnancial markets over the longer term.
DB Pension Funding
In a DB plan, the retirement beneﬁt is typically based
on a formula that can be linked to an employee’s
wages or salary and years of employment. Pension
regulation generally requires that the employer set
aside assets to pre-fund the obligations as they accrue,
with a view to ensuring that plan contributions and
investment returns are sufficient to cover future benefit
payments. The financial and longevity risks are largely
borne by the employer.13
Plan contributions are typically pooled as a fund.14
Plan sponsors aim to have their plan assets in the fund
at least equal the present value of accrued liabilities, in
accordance with regulatory requirements (see Box). It
should be noted that plan liabilities are uncertain
future obligations, linked to the speciﬁc terms of the
plan and workforce demographics. Liabilities are esti-
mated using several assumptions, including projected
retirement age, expected longevity upon retirement,
and wage and salary increases prior to retirement. In
addition, liabilities are sensitive over time to emerging
inﬂation, since the beneﬁts of active employees are
typically linked (directly or indirectly) to their wages,
and retiree beneﬁts are increased in line with some
portion of price inﬂation by many plan sponsors. In
effect, the plan liabilities are a stream of future cash
ﬂows that have similar characteristics to bonds. The
values of both liabilities and ﬁxed-income securities
move inversely to changes in interest rates through
13.  Longevity risk is the risk that plan beneﬁciaries will live longer, on aver-
age, than originally expected, increasing the time period for paying the bene-
ﬁt. Note that the employer is able to transfer some risks to the employees
through increased contributions in a contributory plan or a reduction in pen-
sion or other types of beneﬁt.
14. The term “pension fund” refers to total assets accumulated from plan con-
tributions and the investment earnings on those contributions less beneﬁt
payments. “Pension plan” refers to the contractual arrangement that speciﬁes
the terms of the retirement beneﬁts. A pension fund may manage the assets of
one or more pension plans.
the discount rate used to determine their present
value.15
It is the plan sponsor’s fiduciary responsibility to select
a mix of assets that, combined with the desired level
of plan contributions, will generate sufﬁcient returns
to ensure that liabilities are funded. There is a linkage
between the overall level of investment risk taken and
the expected level of contributions. Riskier assets can
generate a higher return, reducing plan contributions
over the long term. At the same time, investing in risk-
ier assets exposes the plan to a greater risk of a short-
fall, which could require special plan contributions
over the near term. Historically, plan sponsors believed
that the expected incremental return from investing in
equities instead of bonds more than compensated
them for accepting the additional volatility of equities,
since it would reduce plan costs in the long run.
The persistence of funding deﬁcits
in recent years is largely attributable
to the interest rate sensitivity
of pension liabilities.
During the 1990s, many pension funds increased their
stock allocations. As a result, the decline in global
equity markets at the beginning of the decade contrib-
uted to poor performance of the asset portfolio and DB
plan underfunding. The persistence of funding deﬁ-
cits in recent years, however, is largely attributable to
the interest rate sensitivity of pension liabilities. In
2003 and 2004, pension assets grew, mainly as a result
of a recovery in global equity markets and an increase
in plan contributions. But liability growth kept pace,
owing in part to a continued decline in long-term
interest rates (Chart 1).16 Consequently, the funded
status of DB pension plans did not improve (Purcell 2005),
15.  As a rule of thumb, consultants estimate that, for the average pension
fund, a 1 per cent decrease in interest rates leads to a 10 per cent increase in
the present value of plan liabilities.
16.  Chart 1 shows the components of the Watson Wyatt Pension Barometer,
constructed to provide a timely estimate (monthly) of the effects of expected
asset and liability movements on the expected funding status of DB pension
funds. The calculation is based on an index of DB pension plan liabilities,
assets, and the funded ratio (asset/liability index) for a representative pen-
sion fund with an asset mix of 60 per cent equities and 40 percent ﬁxed-
income securities and with retirees representing half of the liabilities.24 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2005
The sponsor of a DB pension plan must set aside
assets to fund uncertain future obligations that will
require payouts over several decades. The funding
of plan liabilities is mainly inﬂuenced by pension
regulations specifying minimum funding rules and
by tax policy.1 Typically, regulators require an actu-
arial valuation of assets and liabilities to be com-
pleted at a minimum of once every three years.2
The actuarial values of assets and liabilities are
compared to determine the funded status of the
plan, which is typically expressed as a ratio. A pen-
sion plan is considered to be in surplus if the
funded ratio of assets to liabilities, in percentage
terms, is greater than 100, in deﬁcit if the ratio is
less than 100, and fully funded if the ratio is equal
to 100.
Two types of valuation are required for regulatory
purposes: a going-concern (funding) valuation and
a solvency valuation.3 In the latter, assets are val-
ued at market or fair value (with smoothing gener-
ally permitted over a period of up to ﬁve years) and
wind-up values used for plan liabilities (i.e., there
isnosalarygrowthandtheretirementageisassumed
to be the age that maximizes the liabilities). Liabili-
tiesareusuallydiscountedbasedoncurrentmarket
interest rates for Government of Canada bonds.
Under existing provincial and federal legislation,
plan sponsors must make special payments to elim-
inate any solvency deﬁciency within ﬁve years.4
1.  At the federal level, pension funds are regulated under the Pension
Beneﬁts and Standards Act (PBSA) 1985, administered by the Ofﬁce of the
Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI). The majority of pension
plans are administered by provincial regulatory authorities. All provinces
except Prince Edward Island have enacted pension beneﬁts legislation
with provisions similar to those of the PBSA.
2.  Pension legislation is somewhat variable across jurisdictions. The dis-
cussion here is intended to present the most common practices.
3.  Another type of valuation, an accounting valuation, is used to deter-
mine the pension expense reported in ﬁnancial statements.
4.  In 2004, the Government of Canada extended Air Canada’s payment
schedule for solvency deﬁciencies from ﬁve to ten years. Although that
change applied only to Air Canada, the government intends to review
ways to provide similar ﬂexibility to all federal pension plans of compa-
nies under the protection of the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act
or the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act. In 2003, New Brunswick amended
the province’s legislation to allow companies that meet certain conditions
to make special payments to restore any solvency deﬁciency over a
period not exceeding 15 years.
A going-concern valuation assumes that the plan
will continue indeﬁnitely. It is based on long-run
values for plan assets that typically incorporate the
ERP expected over the long term. This assumption
of a long-term return on assets (ROA) may also be
used to discount plan liabilities, since a market
interest rate is not required. A going-concern deﬁcit
must be funded by the employer within 15 years.
If pension plans have a funding deﬁcit, as many
currently do, the shortfall must generally be made
up with an increase in employer contributions.
However, plan sponsors may also have the option
of reducing benefits, increasing employees’ required
contribution rates (in contributory plans), or clos-
ing the plan.
For the plan sponsor, one of the most contentious
issues in the regulation of DB pension plans per-
tains to surplus ownership and risk sharing. Under
current pension legislation and trust law (absent
speciﬁc language in the instrument creating the
plan), surpluses generated beyond statutory
requirements are shared with plan members,
while deﬁcits are seen as the sponsor’s responsibil-
ity.5 This asymmetry of risk creates a disincentive
for plan sponsors to build a surplus cushion6 as
protection against a period of adverse market con-
ditions and ultimately makes it more challenging
for plan sponsors to offer DB plans.7
The recent Supreme Court of Canada ruling in the
Monsanto case involving the interpretation of
Ontario’s pension legislation has further high-
lighted the issue of surplus ownership. The ruling
requires an immediate distribution of a portion of
any actuarial surplus on partial plan wind-up. In the
past, legislation had been assumed to mean that
5.  The asymmetry of risk is a complex issue and is not consistent across
plans or regulatory jurisdictions.
6.  There may be accounting incentives for doing so. See Wiedman and
Goldberg (2002) and Zion (2002).
7. From the employee’s perspective, there is a risk that promised pension
beneﬁts, which are a form of deferred compensation, may not be fully
obtained. If there is a deﬁcit in the future, the employee may be exposed
to increased contributions, reduced beneﬁts, or wage concessions as a
result of the employer being forced to fund its pension deﬁcit.
Box
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and plan sponsors faced higher contributions.17 An
increase in interest rates would reduce the present
value of accrued liabilities, but the impact on funded
status would also depend on the effect of higher inter-
est rates on asset values.
17.  Trusteed pension plan contributions more than doubled between 2000
and 2004, from $12.4 to $30.3 billion, following the resumption of regular con-
tributions by many plans that had been taking contribution holidays because
of previous funding surpluses and special payments to eliminate funding def-
icits (Statistics Canada).
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Plan sponsors have come to expect a substantial risk
premium for investing in equities.19 This belief has
been supported by accepted actuarial practices that
assume the use of a long-term, stable ERP to value
assets and, in many cases, liabilities as well. In recent
years, these views have been challenged, particularly
the desirability of using a static, long-term ERP.
Research has suggested that the ERP is time varying
across a wide range of values and that expected
returns in future time periods vary, depending on the
starting point (e.g., Arnott and Bernstein 2002). None-
theless, considerable debate regarding the value and
behaviour of the ERP continues.
From a practical point of view, many pension funds
have reduced their ERP assumptions in recent years;
those of the pension funds that we interviewed ranged
from 2 per cent to 3.5 per cent over long-term bonds.
More broadly, consultants commented that their cli-
ents are using an ERP of, on average, about 3 per cent.
Several interviewees commented that they expect real
pension fund returns over the next several years to be
quite volatile and considerably lower than during the
18.  The ERP is the expected excess return earned on equities relative to the
risk-free interest rate. For a pension fund, the relevant risk-free rate is that of
an instrument with the same duration as plan liabilities, typically proxied
using the rate on long-term (>10 years) bonds.
19.  As a result, the allocation to equities has tended to rise over time, exceed-
ing 60 per cent for a number of pension funds during the 1990s stock market
bubble.
Box (cont’d)
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surplus distribution would occur at full wind-up
when the final value of the plan assets and liabili-
ties are known with certainty. Industry experts
argue that plan sponsors affected by the recent
Monsanto ruling will have even less incentive to tar-
get a surplus cushion in the future.
Another issue relates to the Income Tax Act (ITA)
and the tax-exempt status of pension fund income.
Under the ITA, if a plan has a surplus of assets over
liabilities exceeding a speciﬁed regulatory thresh-
old, sponsors may face a tax penalty if they do not
cease making contributions. During the 1990s, this
situation occurred often, and surpluses that could
have provided a buffer in later years were dis-
tributed to current employees and pensioners.
However, until surplus ownership rules provide
more certainty for employers, an increase in the
regulatory threshold limit is unlikely to result in
higher employer pension contributions and
higher surplus levels for most medium- and large-
sized CS pension plans.26 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2005
1980s and 1990s, perhaps in line with those of the
1960s and 1970s20 (Chart 2). Equity returns will likely
depend on single-digit growth in earnings and divi-
dends, since further expansion of the price-earnings
ratio is unlikely. Given that yields are currently near
historic lows, returns on ﬁxed-income securities (nom-
inal and real) are also expected to be modest.
Liability-focused investment
Historically, pension fund investment has tended to
focus on asset returns.21 Interviewees indicated that,
until recently, many plan sponsors did not fully appre-
ciate the interest rate sensitivity of plan liabilities and
the risks of a large mismatch in the characteristics of
theplan’sassetsandliabilities.22Investmenttendedto
be asset-driven, with performance measured on a rela-
tive basis by comparing returns with those of the
appropriate asset-class benchmark.23 An acceptable
return for the overall pension fund was typically
20.  Over the 20-year period from 1964 to 1983, the median real return for a
balanced fund averaged 1.2 per cent, based on data for a sample of pension
funds.
21.  Even though many pension funds engaged consultants to complete A/L
studies, where both the assets and the liability cash ﬂows are modelled to
determine the appropriate policy asset mix.
22.  Note that, at times, the focus on asset returns is a  result of  poorly
designed  governance and incentive structures, which, according to some
industry experts (e.g., Ambachtsheer 2004), encourage the use of risky assets.
23.  Managing risk relative to liabilities is somewhat more challenging,
because liabilities are not market-based and are typically valued infrequently.
For more detail regarding a liability-focused approach, see Waring (2004).
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deﬁned by comparing the plan’s performance against
the median of a universe of pension plan returns.
Recently, liabilities have been driving pension fund
investment and risk management to an increasing
extent.
In a liability-focused investment framework,24 the
objective of the policy asset allocation25 is the maximi-
zation of the surplus (assets-liabilities) at a given
level of surplus risk (standard deviation of surplus).
Conceptually, a minimum-risk portfolio (MRP) pro-
vides a starting point for a plan sponsor seeking to
reduce the size and possibility of unanticipated swings
in the surplus. This portfolio is composed primarily of
fixed-income securities that respond to changes in
interest rates and inflation, much like the present
value of the liabilities. Using this portfolio as a base,
the policy asset mix is then developed relative to this
minimum-risk position, with the risks of deviating
from the MRP clearly articulated. Performance is
measured relative to plan liabilities rather than to the
market. A key beneﬁt is that this approach provides
the plan sponsor with a much better framework for
understanding how long-term funding and contribu-
tion rates are linked to strategic-asset allocation—in
other words, how funding policy is linked to investment
policy.
A handful of pension funds have adopted a risk-budg-
eting framework that applies the techniques of ﬁnan-
cial risk management to pension funds.26 Since the
systems for measuring and monitoring risk are quite
complex and resource intensive, few pension funds
have implemented a pure risk-budgeting system.
However, many funds are taking a risk-budgeting
approach in A/L studies, where plan sponsors deter-
mine the risk budget27—the amount of risk that they
want to take, typically defined as the maximum
amount of surplus that could be lost in a year. The
policy asset allocation is determined within the context
24.  We use the term liability-focused investment as an alternative to A/L
management to avoid a narrow interpretation. A/L (surplus-risk) manage-
ment was applied to pension ﬁnance during the 1980s but was typically used
in the restrictive sense of duration and cash-ﬂow matching.
25.  The principal tool used to manage risk. It determines the mix of assets
that provide the greatest return for a given level of risk within the context of
choosing the appropriate trade-off between expected contributions, pension
expense, and long-term cost.
26.  Risk budgeting is best suited to managing market and credit risk. See
McCarthy (2000), de Bever (2003), and Urwin et al. (2001).
27.  The risk budget, or surplus-at-risk (SAR), is deﬁned in terms of the liabili-
ties and is measured using value-at-risk (VAR). SAR is the amount by which
the pension plan assets (policy asset allocation) might underperform the lia-
bilities over a given period, at a speciﬁc conﬁdence level (e.g., 95 per cent).27 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2005
of the risk budget, that is, where best to undertake the
risk, and in what amount.
Key Developments in Pension
Investment and Risk Management
A greater focus on plan liabilities and reduced expec-
tations for returns is affecting pension sector invest-
ment and risk management in three ways. First, a
handful of large PS pension funds are beginning to
modify their policy asset mix, reducing exposure to
publicly traded equities in favour of alternative assets
that enhance returns, reduce risk, and/or better match
the long duration of plan liabilities.  Second, limited
A/L matching is being implemented in ﬁxed-income
portfolios to better manage funding risk. Finally, the
passivemanagementstrategiesthatdominatedpension
investment in the 1990s are giving way to a renewed
focusonactivemanagement.Arelatedtrendistowards
freeing managers from benchmarks and specifying
performance requirements in absolute rather than rel-
ative terms.28
The policy asset mix
The emergence of funding deﬁcits has prompted con-
siderable debate regarding the appropriate asset mix.
The policy asset allocation of the majority of Canadian
DB plans has been close to a 60/40 (equity/fixed-
income) split since about the mid-1990s.29 While
there is no apparent consensus regarding the “opti-
mal” asset mix,30 some interviewees believe that cur-
rent equity allocations are excessive, particularly
given changing beliefs regarding the ERP. That said,
pension funds that stayed the course in 2003 and 2004
were rewarded by the recovery in equity markets, par-
ticularly in 2003.
Some pension funds are considering a change in the
policy asset mix to reduce exposure to the volatility
of returns on publicly traded equities. However,
given low yields on ﬁxed-income securities, they are
implementing the change through an increased alloca-
tion to alternative assets, including real estate, private
equity, hedge funds, infrastructure, commodities, and
28. These trends are inﬂuencing the asset-management industry overall. See,
for example, Bernstein (2003).
29. It should be noted that the 60/40 (equity/ﬁxed-income) split is a simpliﬁ-
cation that is used mainly at the policy level. Many pension funds also had
small allocations to other assets, such as real estate, cash, and private equity.
30.  The optimal asset mix depends on several factors, many of them plan-
speciﬁc. Recently, a long-standing debate as to whether pension funds should
be invested primarily in bonds has been rekindled.
timberland.31 For strategic purposes, alternative
assets are increasingly viewed as a third distinct
asset class, based on properties that distinguish them
from publicly traded equities and ﬁxed-income securi-
ties.32 They are incorporated into the asset portfolio as
return enhancers, risk reducers, or both. Hedge funds,
for example, have historically offered high returns but
also provide diversiﬁcation beneﬁts, owing to the low
or negative correlation of certain hedge-fund strate-
gies with publicly traded securities. Alternative assets
can also provide a better match to the long duration of
pension liabilities.
Some pension funds are considering a
change in the policy asset mix to
reduce exposure to the volatility of
returns on publicly traded equities.
Changing asset mix of selected large PS funds
For a handful of industry leaders, the asset mix has
changed considerably over the past several years.
Some large PS pension funds have reduced their expo-
sure to publicly traded equities (and often to fixed-
income securities as well) in favour of investments in
alternative assets. To determine the extent of the shift,
we reviewed the annual reports of the PS pension funds
represented by the industry members that we inter-
viewed.33 We also included the CPP and the Quebec
Pension Plan (QPP),34 considering the large size of the
assets under their management.35 In aggregate, these
entities managed assets of $341.8 billion at the end of
2003 ($259.3 billion if the CPP and QPP assets are
excluded), or just under half of the assets of the
31.  Some alternative assets are distinct asset classes, while others are best
considered as investment strategies. Hedge funds, for example, are invest-
ment strategies using traditional asset classes, although they are often
referred to as alternative assets.
32.  The Ontario Teachers’ Pension Fund has created an asset class based on
liability-hedging properties. It includes infrastructure, Real Return Bonds,
commodities, and real estate.
33.  Included in this group are all pension funds known to have made large
allocations to alternative investments.
34.  The CPP and QPP do not have the same liability structure as DB plans,
since they are only partially funded.
35.  The CPP has made only a small commitment to date, but expects to
increase the policy weighting to 20 per cent over the longer term.28 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2005
100 largest pension funds in Canada. We reviewed
actual investment in alternative assets as well as long-
term policy asset allocations (Table 1).
Actual investment in alternative assets accounted for
nearly 18 per cent of the aggregate assets of these pen-
sion funds, representing over $60 billion in four asset
classes: real estate, hedge funds, infrastructure, and
private equity.36 The range of investments in each
fund was quite broad, however, from a low of less
than 1 per cent37 to a high of 37 per cent. Table 1 also
shows the aggregate policy asset allocation across the
pension funds. The policy asset allocation is the desired
level of investment in alternative assets. In aggregate,
the pension funds plan to invest 29.7 per cent of total
assets ($102 billion) in alternative assets, but to date
have only invested 18 per cent ($61 billion). Note that
the annual reports provide very little detail regarding
the target allocation across each individual type of
alternative asset.
Next to real estate, which is held by all of the pen-
sion funds, private equity is the most common invest-
ment. Like real estate,38 private equity is not a new
asset class for pension funds; some have been
invested since at least the early 1990s. Recently, the
magnitude of actual and planned investment has
increased; many of the pension funds plan to allocate
36. Some pension funds have modest investments in other alternative assets,
such as timberland and commodities.
37.  The pension fund with the extremely low allocation had just begun to
consider alternative assets. If this fund is removed, the lowest allocation
among this group is 5 per cent.
38.  Several pension funds and asset managers have established real estate
subsidiaries. Some are using leverage in real estate investment by issuing
debt through these entities.
Total assets 341.80
Actual allocation
Private equity 14.78 4.3
Infrastructure 5.59 1.6
Hedge funds and absolute-return strategies 13.28 3.9
Real estate 27.62 8.1
Total 61.27 17.9
Policy allocation* 101.61 29.7
Table 1
Aggregate Alternative Asset Allocations for
Selected Large Public Sector Pension Funds
and CPP/QPP, 2003
$ billions %
* Annual reports do not consistently provide breakdowns of policy allocations for each
alternative asset class.
Source: Annual reports
up to 10 per cent of their portfolio to the class. They
are also investing across a broader range of private
equity subclasses, including venture capital, which is
the riskiest form of private equity investment.
Although investment in hedge funds is a form of
active management, these funds were included in
Table 1 along with other alternative assets because a
number of the pension funds are allocating capital to
themwithinthepolicyassetmix.(NotealsothatTable1
does not distinguish between investment in externally
managed hedge funds and internal absolute-return
(AR) strategies implemented by pension fund staff39
because not all pension funds provide a breakdown
between the two.) With the exception of the Ontario
Teachers’ Pension Plan (OTPP), investment in hedge
funds has been quite modest.40 At the end of 2003,
OTPP had invested 5.4 per cent of its assets ($4.1 bil-
lion) in hedge funds, making it one of the largest such
investors globally (Adamson 2004). Their use of AR
strategies in-house accounts for a larger share of this
type of investment ($6.6 billion, or 9 per cent of assets).
If Table 1 is adjusted to exclude OTPP’s AR strategies,
the aggregate percentage allocated to alternative
investments falls to about 15 per cent of total assets.
Infrastructure is a relatively new asset class, consisting
of large investments in public infrastructure; for
example, toll highways, airports, power plants, and
bridges. The asset class provides stable cash ﬂows that
are weakly correlated with public markets and a good
inﬂation hedge, particularly in regulated industries.
Infrastructure investments are long term, often 30 years
or more, matching the long duration of pension liabili-
ties. Globally, Canadian pension funds were among
the ﬁrst to invest in the asset class. Some have made
large, direct investments in infrastructure projects in
the United Kingdom through partnerships and joint
ventures (Capon 2005) and, more recently, in the
United States.
One of the more interesting ﬁndings shown in Table 1
is the large discrepancy between actual investments
and long-term policy asset allocations. Several factors
account for the challenges of achieving the desired
weighting of alternative assets. First, many alternative
assets are quite complex, involving a steep learning
curve. Investing in these assets requires a long lead
time to complete due diligence, educate plan sponsors,
39.  At least ﬁve of the pension funds or asset managers use AR strategies in-
house.
40.  This applies to the sector overall. Tremblay (2004) estimated that Cana-
dian pension funds have invested a total of $10 billion in hedge funds. This
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and set up the appropriate infrastructure for invest-
ment and risk management. We found that actual
asset allocations were closest to policy weightings for
pension funds that had made initial small investments
in the early to mid-1990s. These funds were further
along the learning curve, which facilitated the large
increase in actual investment that has occurred since
the beginning of the decade.41 Several pension funds
that we interviewed were just beginning to make ini-
tial investments in alternative assets other than real
estate. For these pension funds, it may be years before
actual investment matches the policy allocation.
One of the more interesting ﬁndings
. . . is the large discrepancy between
actual investments and long-term
policy asset allocations.
Other reasons for the discrepancy between policy and
actualassetallocationsincludealackofgoodinvestment
opportunities,owingtoasmalleruniverseofinvestable
assets relative to public markets; high current valua-
tions; and a limited supply of top-tier managers.
With regard to the latter, interviewees frequently com-
mented that the high returns associated with alternative
assets are limited mainly to top-quartile managers.
Median returns are modest across many alternative
assets.42 Also cited was the 30 per cent foreign-prop-
erty limit designated under the Income Tax Act
(ITA), which will be discussed in more detail below.
Large PS pension funds frequently invest in private
equity and infrastructure through limited partner-
ships. Although most pension fund investments in
private equity, hedge funds, and infrastructure tend
to be non-domestic, limited partnerships are gener-
ally deemed foreign property under the ITA, even if
all aspects of the partnership are fully Canadian.43
41.  A handful of pension funds or asset managers have specialized in a par-
ticular type of alternative investment, such as private equity, infrastructure,
or hedge funds. These pension funds have enjoyed distinct ﬁrst-mover
advantages. At the extreme, OTPP, for example, which seems to have made
early initial investments across all types of alternative investments, was able
to more than double its investment between 1999 and 2003. OTPP currently
has the highest allocation (about 40 per cent).
42.  Median returns for some alternative assets can sometimes be lower than
returns for publicly traded equities.
43.  Unless they meet the conditions of qualiﬁed limited partnerships (QLPs).
Recent changes to the deﬁnition of QLPs have made them more investment-
friendly, but they remain an administrative burden for private equity ﬁrms,
which prefer to use the more common limited-partnership structure.
Asset mix within the sector overall
Investment consultants commented that most CS pension
funds and smaller PS funds are also reviewing their
investment policies with respect to alternative assets.
Although they would like to allocate 5 to 10 per cent of
their assets over time to reduce risk and add incremental
return, to date, the policy asset mix for most pension
funds remains close to the traditional 60/40 split.
Apart from the largest PS pension funds, funds currently
invested in alternative assets have generally made actual
allocations of no more than 3 to 5 per cent of total assets.
Typically, they have made a small investment in private
equity or hedge funds through funds-of-funds struc-
tures,44 or real estate. Most pension funds are still early
in the process of conducting due diligence and edu-
cating plan sponsors. Furthermore, most plan sponsors
are taking a prudent approach, making small initial
investmentstodeterminewhethertheyhavesufﬁcient
resources to effectively and efficiently manage the asset
class. According to Greenwich Associates, actual invest-
ment in alternative assets (private equity, real estate,
and hedge funds) nearly doubled between 1999 and 2003,
but still represented less than 10 per cent of total
assets, most of which were invested in real estate.45
Chart 3 shows investors’ average allocation to alterna-
tive assets, including the largest pension funds, grouped
44.  Interviewees commented that investment in 20 to 30 individual invest-
ments is required to diversify risk—one reason why funds-of-funds struc-
tures have become so popular. Only the largest pension funds have the
capacity to economically invest directly.
45.  Based on interviews with about 270 pension funds.
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by asset class. Figures for Canada and the United
Kingdom include endowments and foundations,
although these entities account for only a small share
of the aggregate investment. Canadian investors hold-
ing alternative assets have an aggregate allocation of
about 15 per cent overall.  Reﬂecting, in part, pension
sector developments similar to those underway in
Canada, investors in the United States and the United
Kingdom are also increasing their allocation to alter-
native assets. Currently, weightings are similar to
those of Canadian investors.
Limited A/L matching
As noted, although there is greater interest in asset-
liability (A/L) matching, few pension funds have
reduced their allocation to equities in favour of ﬁxed-
income securities. As we have seen, some pension
funds have achieved a limited extension in the dura-
tion of their portfolios by investing in certain types of
alternative assets. As well, a number of pension funds
are implementing a limited form of duration matching
(one of the two main types of A/L matching46), by
extendingthedurationoftheirfixed-incomeportfolios.
Duration matching is accomplished by investing in
assets whose duration matches the average duration
of the plan liabilities. At the extreme, a plan sponsor
could attempt to hedge out (immunize) the liability
completely by investing the entire portfolio in match-
ing ﬁxed-income securities, which is similar to pur-
chasing an annuity.47 However, this strategy presents
practical challenges; for example, the supply of
longer-duration ﬁxed-income securities, particularly
Real Return Bonds (RRBs), which provide the most
effective match for plans indexed to inﬂation, is lim-
ited. The choice of instrument used to hedge the liabil-
ities also depends on how the liabilities are measured,
including, for example, whether future salary increases
are incorporated. Fixed-income securities are best
suited for hedging liabilities that are known with a
high level of certainty, one reason why it is possible to
immunize terminated DB plans.
46.  Duration is a measure of interest rate sensitivity. Matching the average
duration of plan assets and liabilities is a hedge against movements in interest
rates. Cash-ﬂow matching links cash ﬂows from bonds with expected pension
payments.
47.  Originally articulated by Black (1980) and Tepper (1981), this view is
referred to as the ﬁnancial-economics approach. The argument for holding an
all-bond portfolio is developed in terms of the capital structure of the ﬁrm,
considering tax policy and shareholder interests. Proponents of this view typ-
ically point to the example of Boots in the United Kingdom, which put all of
its assets into ﬁxed-income securities in 2001. Boots was able to do this
because at the time it had a very large funding surplus. It has since added a
small share of equities to the policy asset mix.
A/L matching is also costly, given current low interest
rates. The return on a matched portfolio would be
insufﬁcient to meet most funds’ target return on assets
(ROA) or long-term funding target, requiring plan
sponsors to increase contributions and expense recog-
nition substantially over the long term. PS pension
funds, for example, typically need to earn a minimum
real return of about 4 to 5 per cent. At the end of 2004,
the yield on the benchmark RRB was substantially
lower, at about 2 per cent.
Based on our interviews, Canadian pension funds are
not undertaking full A/L matching. However, they
are achieving greater matching at the margin by
extending duration in their ﬁxed-income portfolios.
The average duration for pension plan liabilities ranges
from about 10 to 20 years, but historically, the majority
of pension funds have benchmarked their ﬁxed-
income portfolios to the universe of bonds, whose
duration is much lower. Several pension funds are
reducing the duration gap by benchmarking the port-
folio to long bonds.48 Consultants believe that pension
funds are likely to increase the level of A/L matching
once funding deﬁcits are eliminated.
Passively indexing to market
benchmarks is no longer expected
to generate sufﬁcient returns
to meet targets.
Active management
Active management is assuming a more important
role in pension investment. Given reduced expecta-
tions for returns in public markets, passively indexing
to market benchmarks is no longer expected to gener-
ate sufﬁcient returns to meet targets.
In contrast to passive management, which focuses on
earning market returns (beta), active management
focuses on earning returns regardless of market direc-
tion (typically referred to as earning alpha). Alpha is
generally expressed as the excess, or incremental, return
over the designated asset-class benchmark. Active
management relies on managers having superior skill
or information that can be used to beat the market.
The more efﬁcient the market, the more difﬁcult this
48.  For example, at the end of 2004, the Scotia Capital Universe Index had a
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tends to be. Managers who exceed the market bench-
mark do so at the expense of others, since they are bet-
ting against each other in a zero-sum game. Finding
managers who can consistently outperform their
benchmark is the major challenge.
Investment consultants commented that most pension
funds are ﬁnding it necessary to shift more resources
into active management in order to meet return targets,
which they are accomplishing in a variety of ways,
such as investing in hedge funds and private equity,
increasing the number of active mandates, and using
overlay strategies. Active management is increasingly
viewed as “separable” from the policy asset allocation.
Historically, pension funds actively managed the pol-
icy asset class but, now, through the use of derivatives,
they are able to separate active management from the
policy mix.49 The most significant departure from
past practices is in the use of AR strategies, including
investment in hedge funds, changes in the mandates
of traditional asset managers, and the use of these
strategies in-house. As noted earlier, many large PS
pension funds are allocating a growing share of their
active risk budget to in-house AR strategies.
The objective of AR investment strategies is to generate
positive returns, regardless of the movements in the
markets where the asset classes are invested. While
traditional asset managers have been constrained to
relative performance against asset benchmarks, AR
strategies have been the domain of hedge funds, since
they are not limited to asset benchmarks or to using
long-only strategies.
Other Inﬂuences
Limited supply of long-term bonds
There is a limited supply of nominal bonds and RRBs
to accommodate increased pension sector demand for
purposesofA/Lmatching.Table2showsthesupply of
marketable long-term Government of Canada (GoC)
bonds and the assets of trusteed pension funds.50
(Note that the longest-maturity bond currently issued
by the Government of Canada is 30 years, for both
nominal bonds and RRBs.) As indicated, the supply of
bonds outstanding is small51 relative to the large size
of pension sector assets. Interviewees consistently
commented that they would like to see more issuance
49. This view of active management is typically referred to as “portable” alpha.
50. Note that the assets of trusteed pension funds do not include those of the
CPP or QPP.
51. There are also provincial and corporate issuers of long-term nominal and
inflation-linked bonds, but the supply is a small fraction of GOC bond issuance.
of RRBs to augment this supply, as well as issuance
across a wider range of maturities to create an RRB
yield curve.52 Given the challenges the federal govern-
ment is already facing to maintain the existing supply
in the face of falling borrowing requirements and
issuance, it is unlikely that the demand from pension
funds will be met unless other provinces or corpora-
tions decide to issue these types of securities.53
Foreign-property rule (FPR)
In its 2005 budget, delivered in February, the federal
government announced that it would eliminate the
foreign-property rule (FPR) of the ITA, effective imme-
diately.54 The FPR set a ceiling on the share of the
book value of assets that tax-deferred retirement plans
(Canadian pension plans, registered retirement savings
plans, and registered retirement investment funds)
can invest outside of Canada. The ceiling had been
incrementally increased from the original 10 per cent
in 1971 to 30 per cent in 2001. In practical terms, how-
ever, many pension funds were able to exceed the
limit by using derivatives to establish foreign content.55
In our interviews, the FPR was the most frequently
cited constraint on investment. Interviewees com-
mented that it was costly to circumvent, particularly
for smaller pension funds, and created inefficient
structures and suboptimal investment portfolios. As
pension sector assets have grown, competition for
domestic assets has increased, particularly now that
the CPP is partially funded. The Toronto Stock Exchange
representsabout3to4percentofglobalequitymarkets
and is concentrated in a limited number of sectors,
52.  Note that these views are a subset of those addressed in the regular debt
market consultations (footnote 53) and in the recent  “2003 Market Consulta-
tions on Real Return Bonds: Summary of Comments,” available at http://
www.bankofcanada.ca/en/notices_fmd/2003/market_consult03.html.
53.  The Government of Canada conducts regular debt market consultations
when it is determining its yearly borrowing program, which is outlined in its
annual Debt Management Strategy. For the latest report, see http://
www.ﬁn.gc.ca/toce/2005/dms05e.html.
54.  The budget bill (C–43) received Royal Assent on 29 June 2005.
55.  Derivatives are not treated as ﬁnancial assets.
Nominal bonds, 10 yrs + 58.8
Real Return Bonds 18.7
Assets of trusteed pension plans 688.0
Table 2
Government of Canada Long-Term Bonds and
Pension Sector Assets at Year-End (Can$ billions)
2004
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making portfolio diversiﬁcation difﬁcult to achieve in
the domestic market. In recent years, as we have
already noted, the FPR was also constraining invest-
ment in domestic and foreign alternative assets.
It is difﬁcult to assess how the removal of the FPR will
influence pension investment, and to what extent.
Although the beneﬁts of international portfolio diver-
siﬁcation are well known, institutional investors con-
tinue to exhibit a strong home-country bias. In the
absence of the FPR, it is unclear how much investors
would wish to increase their holdings beyond
30 per cent. Those wanting higher exposure, mainly
larger pension funds, were already able to legally
circumvent the limit using derivatives (e.g., foreign-
equity futures or swaps).
The elimination of the FPR is
providing the occasion for
pension funds to review their
foreign-currency hedging practices.
Most interviewees felt that elimination of the FPR was
likely to have the greatest impact on fixed-income
markets. Historically, aggregate sector investment in
non-domestic ﬁxed-income securities has been less
than 5 per cent of total foreign investment. The elimina-
tion of the FPR makes it possible to hold foreign ﬁxed-
income securities directly within a more diversified
global bond portfolio. It also broadens the universe of
long-duration bonds (nominal and inﬂation-indexed)
available to pension funds seeking greater A/L match-
ing, although this may introduce more complications.
For example, matching liabilities denominated in
Canadian dollars with assets denominated in foreign
currencies exposes pension funds to adverse relative
movements in inﬂation, interest rates, and currencies.
The elimination of the FPR is providing the occasion
for pension funds to review their foreign-currency
hedging practices. During interviews it was clear
that current practices varied considerably across funds.
Most pension funds tend to hedge only U.S.-dollar
assets, but the share of assets hedged varies from 20 per
cent to 50 per cent. Note that the average Canadian
pension fund holds more than 10 per cent of its assets
in U.S. equities, and that several pension funds are
also invested in other U. S.-dollar assets, such as hedge
funds, private equity, and infrastructure. If allocations
to foreign assets increase, it could lead to an increase in
currency hedging.
Accounting standards and actuarial
practices
The growing focus on corporate governance by share-
holders, ratings agencies, and regulators has renewed
a long-standing push for greater transparency in pen-
sion accounting and comparable global standards.
Practices such as delayed recognition of actuarial and
investment gains and losses, the smoothing of plan
assets, and the use of expected rather than actual
returns to calculate pension expenses tend to obscure
the actual value and performance of the pension fund
and the ﬁrm in any given period.56 While the United
Kingdom and, more recently, Europe have recently
adopted new accounting standards that address some
of these issues,57 this has not yet occurred in Canada
and the United States, where reform has been mainly
limited to improving disclosure.
However, in April 2005, the Canadian Accounting
Standards Board (ACSB) launched a consultation
process to solicit views on its plans to make Canadian
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)
consistent with the standards of the International
Accounting Standards Board (IASB). If the ACSB pro-
ceeds with this initiative, a move towards fair-value
pension accounting is likely. Most observers believe
this would accelerate the shift to DC plans for corpo-
rate sponsors, owing to the considerable volatility in
earnings that it is likely to create.58
Many of the criticisms of pension accounting are also
being applied to actuarial standards of practice. Par-
ticularly contentious are the smoothing of asset and
liability values and the use of an ERP rather than a
market interest rate to discount plan liabilities.59 A
debate currently underway within the actuarial profes-
sion concerns the relative merits of traditional actuarial
practices that tend to obscure the economic value of
56.  For simplicity, accounting changes that remove these effects are collec-
tively referred to as fair-value accounting. For a discussion of recent and
anticipated changes in worldwide standards for pension accounting and how
they are likely to inﬂuence pension sector investment, see Fore (2004).
57.  Financial Reporting Standard (FRS) 17 and International Accounting
Standard (IAS) 19. IAS 19 is widely used in Europe.
58.  The introduction of fair-value accounting in the United Kingdom is cited
in the large number of DB plan closures in recent years.
59.  Actuaries can reduce the funding liability by assuming pension assets
will earn an ERP.  On the basis that  the pension assets will earn a premium,
actuaries use a higher discount rate when calculating the present value of the
funding liability, which decreases the value of the liability. Effectively, the
higher the ERP (or the more risk a fund takes on the asset side of the balance
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the pension fund and the valuation principles of
ﬁnancial economics.60 At the heart of the debate is the
issue of whether the pension fund and, ultimately, the
corporate ﬁnancial statements should be subjected to
the volatility of marked-to-market values. Following a
rationale similar to the one used for pension accounting,
traditional actuarial practices such as smoothing have
historically been intended to help alleviate the short-
term effects of market volatility on what is essen-
tially a very long-horizon investment. The outcome of
the debate will have considerable inﬂuence on the
investment behaviour of pension funds, owing to the
central role of actuarial valuation in pension invest-
ment, risk management, sector regulation, and even
ﬁnancial reporting.
Implications for Financial Markets
Over time, more pension funds may shift towards lia-
bility-driven investment and risk-management prac-
tices. This would clearly have implications for financial
markets, given the potential for a fairly large realloca-
tion of assets as the workforce ages and pension funds
mature.
The reduction in the allocation to publicly traded
equities observed in large PS pension funds could
gradually occur in many more pension funds. Over
theshortterm,thisreallocationislikelytobeconstrained
by low interest rates and an attempt to earn high
returns to eliminate funding deficits. The extent to
which a reduction in publicly traded equities can be
offset with an increased allocation to alternative assets
is limited. Not only is the universe of alternative
assets small relative to publicly traded securities,
these investments are much more challenging to man-
age, particularly for smaller pension funds. Also, the
high historic returns that are currently driving invest-
ment decisions are likely to diminish as these markets
become more efﬁcient.
The demand for longer-duration fixed-income securities
could increase substantially as pension funds manage
the risks of older plans where the stream of benefit
payments becomes more certain.61 The demand of DB
pension funds for ﬁxed-income securities could also
be augmented by demand from retirees who wish to
reduce equity allocations in their RRSPs and DC plans.
60. For a detailed discussion of some of the issues, see Society of Actuaries (2004).
61.  The ﬁrst wave of the large baby-boom cohort will begin to retire in 2010.
DB pension plans will have increasingly fewer active members than retirees.
Some governments have begun to issue longer-maturity
bonds, partly in response to pension sector demand;
50-year bonds have recently been issued in the United
Kingdom and in Europe.62 Given the limited supply,
the additional demand may contribute to a distortion
of the yield curve. Indeed, it has already been cited as
one of the factors behind the recent pressure on the
long end of the U.S. yield curve. In Canada, pension
sector demand for RRBs has been particularly strong
relative to supply, which is one explanation offered for
recent distortions in RRB yields.63 Interviewees con-
sistently commented that they would like to hold more
RRBs for purposes of hedging liabilities.
As noted, there is a limited supply of long-term bonds
outstanding relative to pension sector assets. Although
the federal government has maintained its commit-
ment to 30-year bonds and RRBs against a backdrop of
debt reduction and reduced bond issuance, there are
no plans to increase issuance from current levels.  In
its Debt Management Strategy 2005–2006, the govern-
ment indicated that while it will continue to target a
gradual reduction in the share of ﬁxed-term debt to
lower public debt charges (by increasing the issues of
treasury bills while reducing the bond program), it
has made a commitment to maintain issuance of RRBs
in 2005–2006 at a level similar to the $1.4 billion issued
in 2004–2005. The elimination of the FPR may address
some of the supply concerns. However, some interview-
ees were reluctant to hedge their Canadian-dollar lia-
bilities, domestic inflation surprises, and domestic
interest rate moves using foreign securities. These
risks must be thoroughly researched, since they may
offset the benefits of A/L matching, which aims to
hedge the plan against movements in interest rates
and, in the case of indexed plans, inflation. If cross-
country shifts in the yield curve and changes in inflation
arenotcomparable,theobjectivewillnotbeachieved.
The adoption of fair-value accounting has the poten-
tial to introduce considerable volatility to the ﬁnancial
statements of corporate plan sponsors. This could
prompt a reallocation of assets into ﬁxed-income secu-
rities that provide a better match to plan liabilities and
reduce volatility. It could also accelerate the shift away
from DB plans, as it has in other countries.
62.  At least one issuer is structuring a bond to manage longevity risks.
63.  Reid, Dion, and Christiansen (2004) noted that these distortions limit the
usefulness of the spread between nominal bonds and RRBs as an indicator of
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Conclusion
Developments in the past few years have underlined
the ﬁnancial risks inherent in DB pension plans. Many
Canadian pension plans appear to be taking steps to
better manage these risks by increasing their under-
standing of pension obligations and the volatility of
the returns on their pension portfolios. For the majority
of pension funds, however, this has not yet resulted in
signiﬁcant changes to their policy asset allocations or
investment strategies. Given the sector’s conservative
nature, it is likely that a reallocation of pension sector
assets will progress gradually. As the workforce ages
and DB pension funds continue to mature, more assets
could be shifted into fixed-income securities that better
match the duration of liabilities and beneﬁt payouts.
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